PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CYBERSPACE: ESTABLISHING
PRECEDENT IN A BORDERLESS ERA
Timothy B. Nagy

In light of modern technological advancements, courts across the country are faced with a
unique challenge that will have far-reaching
ramifications.' The challenge comes from the
realm known as "cyberspace." 2 The issue to be addressed is inherently difficult given the distinct
nature of cyberspace and the Internet, the medium through which it is accessed. 3 Users of the
Internet benefit from the medium's ability to
reach large audiences. 4 However, this benefit
gives rise to one of the most legally troubling features of cyberspace, which is the ability of computer users to transcend physical borders without
5
ever leaving their homes or places of business.
Computer users who interact in cyberspace are
not likely to be aware of the implications of being
I See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pub., Inc.,
939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
declaration of personal jurisdiction over providers on the
World Wide Web could have a "devastating impact" on those
who use the service).
2 See Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdictionand the Internet: FundamentalFairnessin the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 339 (1996). The term "cyberspace" was originally used by William Gibson to describe "the consensual hallucination that has many aspects of physical space, but is
merely computer-generated abstract data." Id. at 343 n.12
(citations omitted); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
871 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The Internet is "a decentralized, global
medium of communications-or, 'cyber space'-that links
people, institutions, corporations and governments around
the world .

.

. These communications can occur almost in-

stantaneously, and can be directed either to specific individuals, to a broader group of people interested in a particular
subject, or to the world as a whole." Id. See also Lawrence H.
Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the
ElectronicFrontier,THE HUMANIST, Mar. 26, 1991, at 15. Cyberspace is a place "without physical walls or even physical
dimensions" in which interaction occurs as if it happened in
the real world and in real time. Id.
3
See Zembek, supra note 2, at 343 (noting that users sign
onto the Internet and surf through cyberspace). See also Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc., 960 F. Supp.
456, 478 (D. Mass. 1997) (defines "surfing" as "moving
quickly from Web-page to Web-page").
4
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL
97097, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997), quoting ACLU, 929 F.

in a borderless, technological forum. 6 In effect,
they lack the requisite notice of which laws and

customs may govern their activity in cyberspace.
As with all media of communication, cyberspace may be the site for violations of personal
and commercial rights. The pertinent issue concerns thejudiciary's assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants who interact
with other computer users over the Internet.
Courts must decide whether to address these violations under the traditional doctrines of personal
jurisdiction 7 or to create a virtual body of law" to
deal with infractions that occur in a "fictional"
place. 9 Many courts have chosen the former over
the latter, and in doing so, have arrived at incon-

Supp. at 844. "Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users worldwide... Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it
cannot prevent that content from entering any community ...Internet technology gives a speaker a potential worldwide audience." Id.
5 See id. (suggesting that internet surfers are not aware
that they have legally traveled outside their home).
6
See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997). "Physical boundaries typically have framed legal boundaries, in effect creating signposts that warn that we will be required after crossing to
abide by different rules." Id. at 463. See also David R. Johnson
& David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996). "In cyberspace, physical borders no longer function as signposts informing individuals of
the obligations assumed by entering into a new, legally significant, place." Id. at 1375.
7 See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).,
8 SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 6, at 1375 (suggesting
the need for creation of clear legal rules for the entirely new
phenomena known as cyberspace); William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual
Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197 (1995) (advocating
legislative action rather than judicial distortion of existing
statutes for cyberspace communities).
9 See Zembek, supra note 2, at 345. Legal disputes require a court to either develop a new body ofjurisprudence
or select analogous legal precedents and fictions to analyze
the emerging cyber-action. Id.
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sistent and sometimes contradictory results."'
The traditional test for determining whether a
court has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant requires consideration of the forum
state's long-arm statute" and the constitutional
requirements of due process. 12 In particular,
courts must evaluate whether the activity in cyberspace is purposefully directed towards the forum
state such that the assertion of jurisdiction would
not violate a defendant's due process rights. All
states have enacted long-arm statutes which enable a court to exercise its jurisdiction out of the
forum state and to bring a nonresident defendant
into the state to defend a lawsuit. '3 A number of
long-arm statutes provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant, or a representative of a non-domiciliary defendant, who transacts any business within the
4
state or commits a tortious act within the state.'
Application of a long-arm statute usually involves
consideration of whether or not the non-domiciliary regularly conducts or solicits business in the
forum state and whether or not substantial reve5
nues are generated through such interaction.'

Courts that have applied long-arm statutes have
broadly interpreted such statutes to enhance their
powers and permit the exercise of their jurisdiction. 16
The second requirement for the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction is that it be consistent
with the notions of due process as provided in the
Constitution of the United States.1 7 Due process
requires a non-domiciliary defendant to have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state
such that he/she could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.' 8 Although courts vary
in their approaches, satisfaction of the minimum
contacts requirement usually involves an analysis
of the quality and nature of the defendant's contacts with the state seeking to invoke its jurisdiction over the defendant.1 9 General jurisdiction is
evidenced by "continuous, systematic and substantial" contacts between the defendant and the forum state. 20 To hold that sufficient minimum contacts exist, a court must find that the nonresident
defendant purposefully availed himself to the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable. 2' By contrast, specific jurisdiction ex-

'0 See CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,1260
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that Ohio court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Texas resident based on use
of Internet database); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96
Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997)
(holding that defendant from New Jersey is not subject to
jurisdiction of New York courts based on Internet web site);
Digital Equip., 960 F. Supp. at 466 (holding that Massachusetts' court could exercise jurisdiction over California defendant for alleged trademark infringement involving the Internet); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding that California user was properly
subject to jurisdiction in Missouri based on Internet activity);
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that Missouri defendant is not subject to exercise ofjurisdiction by New York court based on its
web site), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d. Cir. 1997); and Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996) (holding that Connecticut court could exercise jurisdiction over Massachusetts defendant as a result of trademark dispute on the Internet).

960 F. Supp at 464.
16 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that even if conduct did not violate a specific provision of the long-arm statute, the court was authorized to exercise its jurisdiction to
the "fullest extent" allowed under the Constitution); Maritz,
947 F. Supp. at 1331 (reasoning that although infringing activities occurred "wholly" outside the forum state, the longarm statute could be properly invoked because the activities
had produced an effect in the state).
17 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 315 (1945). Courts must consider whether the state can
exact the desired remedy consistently with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
18
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297-98 (1980) (holding that an Oklahoma court does
not have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile
retailer and its distributor when the defendant's only connection with the forum state was the fact that an automobile sold
in New York to New York residents became involved in an
accident in Oklahoma).
19 See Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816
(8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit has set forth a five-part
test for measuring minimum contacts: (1) the nature and
quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity
of those contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to
the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing
a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the parties. See id. at 819 (citing Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983)).

II
TICE

SeeJAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-

§ 108.6011] (3d ed. 1997). Defines "long-arm statute"

as "statutory limits on the exercise of jurisdiction over non-

resident defendants." Id.
12
See Maritz, Inc., 947 F. Supp. at 1329.
1- See Moore et al., supra note 11, § 108.60[1].
14 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c) (West 1958)
(Connecticut long-arm statute); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch.223A, 3 (West 1985) (Massachusetts's long-arm statute),
Mo. ANN. STAT. 506.500 (West 1952) (Missouri's long-arm
statute); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2307.382(A) (Anderson
1995) (Ohio's long-arm statute).
'5
See Bensusan Rest., 937 F. Supp. at 299; Digital Equip.,

20

JAMES WM. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 108.41 [1] (3d ed. 1997) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-447 (1952)).
21
Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23
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ists if the claim results specifically from the defendant's contacts with the forum state. 22 Regardless of the distinction, courts must ensure
compliance with "traditional notions of fair play
23
and substantial justice."
Jurisdictional issues involving the use of the Internet create a more difficult problem. As previously suggested, in most instances computer users
are unaware that they have transcended physical
borders and are subject to the jurisdiction of any
state in which their message is received. 24 Hence,
application of a state's long-arm statute to Internet users may not comply with the notion of
due process since a user cannot purposefully avail
himself of a particular jurisdiction if he has no indication where he is in cyberspace. The confusion which Internet users experience is exacerbated by the different approaches of district
courts to the issue of personal jurisdiction. 25 This
inconsistency has continued at the appellate
level. 26 In this technological era, the courts need

to develop a consistent approach for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in causes of action involving the Internet, while simultaneously adhering to
the traditional standards of due process.
This Note begins with a brief explanation of the
Internet and how personal jurisdiction issues
arise. Part II focuses on the early cases involving
interactions in cyberspace, and the initial findings
by some courts that their exercise of jurisdiction
would be inappropriate. Part III examines how
F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). The courts have established a
three-part test for minimum contacts to determine whether
jurisdiction may be exercised: (1) the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum

state or causing a consequence in the forum state. (2) the
cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities [in
the forum state].

(3) the acts of the defendant or conse-

quences caused by the defendant must have a substantial
enough connection with the forum to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. See id. at 1116
(citation omitted).
22

SeeJAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-

§ 108.42[1] (3d ed. 1997). Claims must arise from or be
related to defendant's activities within the state. See id.
TICE

23

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

316 (1945). See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 478 (1985). The Supreme Court identified the following factors to consider when evaluating fairness: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenience and effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive policies. See id. (citing

courts overcame their resistance and began to
take a more assertive approach towards the exercise of their jurisdiction. Part III concludes with
examples of how the courts began to develop
standards and to properly limit their jurisdiction
to those instances in which it is most reasonable.
Part IV addresses the future of personal jurisdiction over users of the Internet. The Note concludes by suggesting the adoption of a flexible
standard that is consistent with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice required
by the Due Process clause.

I. THE INTERNET AND INTERACTIONS IN
CYBERSPACE.
The Internet is a global communications network linked principally by modems which transmit electronic data over telephone lines. 27 Physical access to the Internet is established through
use of a computer that is directly connected to a
computer network (which is itself connected to
the Internet) or use of a personal computer with a
modem.28 When Internet users interact in cyber-

space, their behavior is likely to give rise to typical
legal disputes, such as those involving "promotional sales, breaches of contract, and tortious
conduct.

'29

Consequently, there is a question of

authority to determine which state court has personal jurisdiction over the actors involved.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
24
See Johnson & Post, supra note 6, at 1371. "The Net
enables transactions between people who do not know, and
in many cases cannot know, each other's physical location."
Id.
25
See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,
937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). But see Hearst Corp. v.
Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

26, 1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
26
See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th
Cir. 1996). But see Bensusan, 126 F.3d 25.
27
See Inset Systens, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
28
See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
29
Zembek, supra note 2, at 345-346. "As would be ex-

pected, cyber-relationships give rise to legal disputes... One
quickly realizes that the actors and activities are real upon
examining the underlying facts of typical cyber-actions-promotional sales, breaches of contract, and tortious conduct."
(The author gives examples of each of these situations). Id.
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THE INITIAL RESISTANCE TO EXTEND

JURISDICTION
Initially, courts were hesitant to expand their
power into the vast world of cyberspace, and
therefore, tended to conclude that the exercise of
jurisdiction with respect to Internet users would
be unreasonable. For instance, when the federal
district court in Ohio first grappled with the issue
1
of jurisdiction in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,""
the court determined that enabling the user's
contacts with the forum to subject the user to personal jurisdiction in the forum where the service
provider is located would be "manifestly unreasonable." 3' The issue arose as the result of a dispute between a Houston, Texas resident, Richard
Patterson, who entered into software agreements
with CompuServe, which was then located in Columbus, Ohio, via his computer.3 2 CompuServe
provided Internet access on its network to subscribers who entered the system through their
own hardware and telephone line.3 3 The agreements provided a means by which Patterson could
distribute his software programs to other Internet
users. 34 Patterson eventually became disgruntled
when CompuServe began to market its own comparable program, and a dispute alleging trademark infringement ensued. 3 5 CompuServe
brought a declaratory judgment action in Ohio's
30 See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, No. C2-9491, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20352 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 1994),
rev'd 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant's
links were "too tenuous" to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, and therefore, granting defendant's motion to
dismiss).
31 Id. at *20-21. (noting that this issue does not differ
from the standard out of state customer dispute and that any
court would have a difficult time concluding the exercise of
personal jurisdiction was proper).
342 See id. at *4.
13 See id. at *2.
"34 Id. Patterson and CompuServe entered into a user
Agreement which provided that: "The CompuServe information service . . .consists of computing and information service and software, information and other content provided
by CompuServe Incorporated ("CompuServe"). In addition,
third parties provide information, software, and other content ... which may be accessed over the Service." Id.
'5 CompuServe, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20352 at *3. "This
lawsuit arises out of certain software which Patterson claims
to have developed, and which is entitled "WinNav," "Windows Navigator," and "FlashPoint Windows Navigator." Id.
Sometime in late 1993, CompuServe announced to its users
that it had developed, and would soon be releasing, a Windows version of a program to be entitled "CompuServe Navigator." Id. As a result of this announcement, Patterson advised CompuServe of his claim to a common law trademark
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Southern District, and Patterson subsequently
moved to dismiss the complaint based on lack of
36
personal jurisdiction.
In support of Ohio's jurisdiction, CompuServe
argued that the Agreement was made and performed in Ohio, the product's locus was in its
server in Columbus, Ohio, and that Patterson had
sufficient contacts with the forum state.3 7 Despite
CompuServe's assertions, the court noted that the
nature of Patterson's contacts with Ohio residents
was not sufficient enough to establish that Patterson had purposefully availed himself to the laws of
the state.3 1 In doing so, the court reiterated that
physical entry into the state was not necessary to
the assessment of whether the nonresident purposefully availed himself.3 9 The court further
ruled that Ohio courts lacked jurisdiction since
Patterson's contacts did not even give rise to the
cause of action. 40 Finally, in holding that Patterson's contacts with Ohio were too tenuous to establish jurisdiction, the court acknowledged that
41
to hold otherwise would simply be unfair.
Another instance where a court was hesitant to
conclude that it had jurisdiction over a conflict
arising out of dealings involving computer networks was Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access,
InC. 42 In Pres-Kap, the non-domiciliary defendant
43
was a business owned and operated in New York.

in the names "WinNav," "Windows Navigator," and
"FlashPoint Windows Navigator," and suggested that if CompuServe released its software, it would be violating his trademark rights." Id.
"-, See id. at *3-4.
"47 See id.
•8 CompuServe, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20352 at *16-17
(characterizing the relationship as a "minimal course of dealing" since an independent, ongoing relationship was not
contemplated).
M) See id. at *11. Although physical entry into the forum
state is not necessary in order for the Court to find that a
defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting business there, there is a requirement that the
connection between the defendant's activities and the forum
state be more than incidental before jurisdiction can constitutionally be exercised. See id. (citation omitted).
40 See id.at *18 (noting that CompuServe relied on defendant's status as a CompuServe user, when in fact, the use
of the network is incidental to the trademark dispute between the parties).
41
See id.at *20-21. It would be manifestly unreasonable
for this or any Ohio court to exercise jurisdiction over this
case. Id.
,"2 See generally Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).
4-1 See id. at 1352.
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Pres-Kap, the plaintiff, was headquartered in
Miami, Florida, but maintained a branch office in

III.

New York. 44 The defendant contracted with rep-

resentatives of Pres-Kap in its New York offices to
lease computer terminals which accessed the

THE RECOGNITION THAT
JURISDICTION EXISTS: THE
TRANSITION FROM AN ASSERTIVE
APPROACH TO ADOPTION OF
REASONABLE STANDARDS.

main computer base in Miami. 45 The defendant

company made its monthly payments to the billing office in Miami. 46 Despite the facts that the
payments were made to the Miami office and the
computer database accessed by the defendant was
located in Miami, the state trial court in Florida
found that there were not sufficient minimum
contacts for System One, Direct Access to expect
47
to have to defend against suit in Florida.
In its analysis, the Florida court suggested that
the nature of "on-line" computer services is such
that to bring suit at the site of the central database
would be inefficient. 48 The court also noted the
recent flourish in contractual arrangements entered into on-line, and the unreasonableness of
subjecting users to the jurisdiction of the
database's location. 49 Of particular importance

was the potential detriment to commercial transactions and research efforts that are conducted
on-line. 50 For example, the costs of defending

against litigation in numerous states may make
5
the operation of a web site more expensive. '
Similarly, access to the Internet is indispensable to
the research efforts of educational institutions
and manufacturers.

52

See id. at 1351.
See id. at 1352.
46
See id.
47
See id. at 1353. "It is settled law that an individual's
contract with an out-of-state party alone can[not] automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other
party's home forum to support an assertion of in personam
jurisdiction against the out-of-state defendant." Pres-Kap, 636
So. 2d at 1353 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 478 (1985)).
48
See supra, note 42 and accompanying text. "The additional factor in this case that the computer database for the
contracted-for information happens to be located in Florida
cannot change this result." Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353.
49
See Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353. The court expressed
dismay that users of such "on-line" services could be haled
into court in the state in which a supplier's billing office and
database happen to be located. Id.
50
See id. "Across the nation, in every state, customers of
"on-line" computer information networks have contractual
arrangements with out-of-state supplier compa44
45

nies ... Lawyers, journalists, teachers, physicians, courts, uni-

versities, and business people throughout the country daily
conduct various types of computer-assisted research over tele-

Despite the initial resistance of the CompuServe
and Pres-Kap courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over Internet users, other courts began to approach the issue of jurisdiction differently as the
number of Internet controversies increased.
Some courts were not in awe of the technological
prowess of the Internet and dispelled with the notion that the exercise ofjurisdiction would be tantamount to a claim of worldwide jurisdiction.
These courts realized that, inevitably, the exercise
ofjudicial power can provide Internet users with a
sense of security and enable users to take advantage of the technological phenomenon. The following section outlines this approach.
A.

Violations of Federal Statute

53
The first case of note is United States v. Thomas,
in which the defendant was found guilty of advertising and displaying sexually explicit materials on
his electronic bulletin board. 54 Among defendant's arguments was his claim the exercise ofjurisdiction was improper based on the fact that he
did not have knowledge of the transmissions of

phone lines linked to supplier databases located in other
states." See id.
51
See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 456 (D.Mass. 1997). Judge Gertner states "[I]t
is troubles [sic] me to force corporations that do business
over the Internet, precisely because it is cost-effective, to now
factor in the potential costs of defending against litigation in
each and every state; anticipating these costs could make the
maintenance of a Web-based business more expensive." Id.
at 471.
52 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
"Such access enables students and professors to use information and content provided by the college or university itself,
and to use the vast amount of research resources and other
information available on the Internet worldwide." Id. at 832.
5- See generally United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th
Cir. 1996) (computer bulletin board operator was subject to
venue in forum where allegedly obscene material was received despite allegedly intangible form of the materials).
54
See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 833. Defines electronic bulletin board as a dial-in computer service "where friends,
members, subscribers, or customers can exchange ideas and
information." Id.
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obscene materials at the time they occurred.
However, in this instance, the defendant was violating a federal statute which made it per se illegal
to transmit obscene material. 56 Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit determined that jurisdiction was
proper in every judicial district from, through, or
into which the obscene material moved. 57
Although Thomas was significant because a federal
statute was involved, the holding at that time represented a clear shift towards more assertive exercises of jurisdiction.

The Trademark Examples

B.

Other examples of cases in which courts exercised their personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants continued to emerge. For example,
in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. ,58 the
United States District Court in Connecticut determined that the Internet advertisements of a Massachusetts corporation which solicited business in
Connecticut were of a sufficient nature to invoke
the Connecticut long-arm statute. 59 The court
also held that the Massachusetts corporation's advertisements were sufficient minimum contacts to
support the

exercise

of jurisdiction. 60

Inset,

which is located in Connecticut, developed and
61
marketed computer software on a global basis.
Instruction Set, which was located in Massachusetts, provided computer technology and support
to organizations throughout the world. 62 Inset
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registered the name "INSET" as its trademark. 6 3
Meanwhile, Instruction obtained the name "INSET.COM"' as its Internet domain address. 64 Inset's main concern was that since the domain
name was identical to the trademark name, users
might inadvertently contact an unintended company and the result would be "confusion in the
65
marketplace.
The court reached its decision regarding the
applicability of the long-arm statute despite the
fact that the defendant did not have any employees or offices in Connecticut and the finding that
it did not conduct business in Connecticut on a
regular basis. 6 6 The basis for the court's conclusion was its reliance on a provision of the Connecticut long-arm statute which provides that an
out-of-state defendant will be subject to suit in the
state if a cause of action arises out of business
67
which has repeatedly been solicited in the state.
Solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature was
found to exist based on the number of Internet
access sites in Connecticut. 6 Of particular importance was the observation that, unlike hard-copy
advertisements, Internet advertisements are not
easily disposed of and can be accessed repeatedly
by potential consumers. 69 As a result, once the
contacts are initiated they are continually maintained.
In its minimum contacts analysis, the Inset court
focused on whether or not the defendant could
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in

See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709. Defendants argued that

If a company uses a domain which is identical to the

government agent, without their knowledge, accessed and
downloaded the files at issue. See id.

name or trademark of a company, an Internet user may
inadvertently access an unintended company. Thereafter, the Internet user may not realize that the advertise-

55

56

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1465 (West 1995 Supp.) and Thomas,

74 F.3d at 709. "To establish a Section 1465 violation, the
Government must prove that a defendant knowingly used a
facility or means of interstate commerce for the purpose of
distributing obscene materials ... Section 1465 does not require the Government to prove that Defendants had specific
knowledge of the destination of each transmittal at the time
it occurred." Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
57
58

See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.

161 (D. Conn. 1996).
59
60

See id.

See id. at 164-65. "Solicitation of business" was found
to exist because defendant had repeatedly solicited business
within the forum state via its internet advertisement and the
availability of its toll-free number. Id.
61

See id. at 162.

62

See id.
Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
Id.
Id.

63
64
65

ment is actually from an unintended company, or the

Internet user may erroneously assume that the source of
information is the intended company. As a result, confusion in the marketplace could develop.

Id.
See id. at 162-164.
See id. at 164. The Connecticut long-arm statute,
C.G.S. § 33-411 (c) (2) states that:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this
state, by a resident of this state ...on any cause of action
arising . . .(2) out of any business solicited in this
state . . . if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited
66

67

business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto
were accepted within or without the state .

Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
68
See id. "[Defendant] has been continuously advertising
over the Internet, which includes at least 10,000 access sites

in Connecticut." Id.
69 See id. (noting that Internet advertisments are unique
because they are in electronic printed form).
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Connecticut. 70 The court found that the Massa-

by the plaintiff and its employees. 79 The court

chusetts corporation had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Connecticut, and therefore could reasonably anticipate
having to defend against a lawsuit there, primarily
because it had established a toll-free number in
71
conjunction with its Internet advertisements.
The implication of this conclusion is obvious;
such reasoning would subject the defendant to jurisdiction not only in Connecticut but potentially
in all fifty states. In Inset, the court also assumed
that the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would not be compromised if the
case were to be adjudicated in Connecticut because the distance between the forum state and

reasoned that Missouri's long-arm statute was applicable because Maritz had suffered economic
harm and injury in the state of Missouri as a result
of the defendant's behavior.8 0
The court's evaluation of due process focused
on the quality and nature of CyberGold's contacts. Although CyberGold sought to characterize
its web site as merely "passive," the district court
found otherwise.8 ' The court's conclusion that
CyberGold "consciously" decided to transmit its
advertisement appeared to satisfy the requirement
of purposeful availment. 82 Yet, in the same
breath, the court acknowledged that CyberGold's
web site "automatically and indiscriminately" responded to each user who accessed the web site.8 5
The court offered no explanation as to how a defendant can purposefully avail himself of the benefits of a jurisdiction when he has no discretion
or control as to where the site will be accessed.
The only support is found in the court's suggestion that since technology has made transactions
simpler and more feasible, the permissible scope
of jurisdiction exercisable by the courts must be

72
the defendant's home state was "minimal.
In Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,73 a United

States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri likewise held that a forum state could
properly exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
who had advertised over the Internet.7 4 In this instance, the non-domiciliary defendant operated
an Internet server in California, which allowed
users to sign onto a mailing list to receive advertisements. 75 The site was not yet operational; it
merely promoted the upcoming service to be provided. 7 6 The plaintiff, a corporation located in

Missouri, filed suit claiming trademark infringement and unfair competition. 77

In response,

CyberGold argued that the only alleged contact
with the state of Missouri resulted from the mere
fact that its web site was accessible to Missouri residents. 78

Furthermore,

Cybergold

argued, the

number of times Missouri residents had accessed
the site was only 311, and 180 of those times were
70 See id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). "[Due Process] limitations

require that a nonresident corporate defendant have 'minimum contacts' with the forum state such that it would reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id.
71
See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
72 See id.
73 See generally 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
74 See id.
7576

See id. at 1330.
See id.

77
See id. at 1329. Maritz, Inc. asserts that CyberGold's
web site acts as a state-wide advertisement for CyberGold's
forthcoming service, and through the web site, CyberGold is

"actively soliciting" customers from Missouri. Id.
78 See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 1331. "[T]he court concludes that Missouri's

long-arm statute reaches the defendants, even assuming
Cyberrold's allegedly infringing activities were wholly

84
enhanced in order to keep pace.

C.

Reversal of CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson

The view that a more expansive exercise of jurisdiction over Internet activity is necessary lead
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit to reverse the holding of CompuServe, Inc.
v. Patterson.85 In its opinion, the court held that
the non-domiciliary defendant had purposefully
availed himself of the benefits of doing business
outside of Missouri, because the allegedly infringing activities
have produced an effect in Missouri as they have allegedly
caused Maritz economic injury." Id.
81 Id. at 1333. "The website invites internet users to use
CyberGold's new service when it becomes operational. This
service and the promotional efforts that CyberGold is employing by posting the information on its website are allegedly infringing on plaintiff's alleged trademark." Id.
82 Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330. "Through its website,
CyberGold had consciously decided to transmit advertising
information to all internet users, knowing that such information will be transmitted globally." Id.
83 See id.
84

See id. at 1334 (quoting California Software Inc. v. Reli-

ability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (suggesting that the scope of courts should be broadened in response to technological advancements)).
85
See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996), revg No. C2-94-91, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20352 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 1994).
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in the forum state, that the cause of action arose
from the defendant's contacts with the forum
state, and that the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable. 6
In its approach, the Sixth Circuit Court focused
on whether Patterson's contacts with the state
where the computer network service was headquartered were "substantial. 8s 7 Of particular im-

portance was Patterson's written contract with
CompuServe which specified that the transactions
would be governed by Ohio law. 8 But the contract alone was not the decisive factor. The
court's finding of minimum contacts was also
based on Patterson's injection of his software into
the stream of commerce.8 9 Beyond finding that
Patterson had "consciously" reached out from
Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe, 90 the
court emphasized that Patterson had "originated
and maintained" his contacts with CompuServe. 9 1
The court also determined that Ohio's exercise of
its jurisdiction was reasonable because, although
defending the suit in Ohio would be burdensome
to Patterson, he did voluntarily place his software
92
on CompuServe's Ohio-based system.
D.

Pulling Back the Reins- The Search for a
More Reasonable Approach

In the past year, the approaches to jurisdiction
implemented by courts have demonstrated more
reasoned analysis and greater consistency. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has been very successful in devel-

87

See id.
Id. at 1264.

88

See id.

86

89 See id. at 1265, citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) ("The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act
of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State.").
90 See id.at 1266. "Patterson consciously reached out
from Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe, and to use
its service to market his computer software on the Internet."
ConipuServe, 89 F.3d at 1266.
9 I Id. (focusing on defendant's repeated use of elec-

tronic and regular mail for messages to CompuServe and the

posting of a message on one of CompuServe's electronic forums).
92
See id. at 1267. Someone like Patterson who employs a
computer network service like CompuServe to market a
product can reasonably expect disputes with that service to
yield lawsuits in the service's home state. See id. at 1268.
93
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997

oping a thoughtful, reasoned framework to determine the proper exercise of jurisdiction. Among
the district court's opinions setting forth a concise
analysis is Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger.93 In Hearst,
the court determined that New York courts lacked
jurisdiction

over a non-domiciliary defendant

whose Internet web site was merely accessible to
New York residents. 94 The defendant in Hearst
was an attorney who lived in New Jersey and
worked as an associate at a law firm in Philadelphia. 95 Goldberger developed a network, accessible by computer, to provide legal support services
to individual attorneys.'" At the time of the proceeding, the web site was not yet operational, but
merely consisted of a home page that briefly described the services Goldberger planned to offer.9 7 Hearst, which publishes the ESQUIRE magazine, argued that Goldberger's domain name,
"ESQWIRE.COM", infringed on its trademark. 98
In its opinion, the Hearst court acknowledged
that the issue of personal jurisdiction based solely
on plaintiffs accessing a web site from their jurisdiction has split the federal district courts. 9 9 The
court adopted the approach that resolution of the
issue must be made by analogy to existing, nonInternet case law.' 0 0 The relevant portion of the
New York long-arm statute requires that the nondomiciliary defendant transact business in the
state and the cause of action must arise out of
such a transaction for jurisdiction to lie in New
York. °0 While considering the nature and quality
of Goldberger's contacts, the court noted that the
web site at issue was not targeted at the residents
WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
94 See id. at *1 (finding that defendant has not contracted
to sell or actually sold any products or services to computer
users in the forum state).
95 See id. at *3.
961 See id. Goldberger came up with the idea to "create an
electronic law office infrastructure network that would provide individual attorneys, via computer, with legal support
services equivalent to those available to lawyers practicing in
large law firms." Id.
q7
See id. at *4.
98 Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *3. The complaint alleges
that Hearst's ESQUIRE and ESQ marks "have acquired tremendous secondary meaning" and that those marks are "inherently distinctive, nonfunctional, strong and famous marks
entitled to a very broad scope of protection." See id.
99
100

See id. at *7.
See id.

1)
See id. at *8 (quoting Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc., v.
Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1051 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)).
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of New York or any other particular state.' 0 2 The
court referred to previous instances which held
that advertisements directed towards the New

0
York market10' 3 and the use of an 800 number'

4

were insufficient to satisfy the transaction of business requirement. 0 5 Goldberger's contacts were
even less intrusive since he had not sold any products; the site was merely an announcement. The
court reasoned that since the web site was "analogous to an advertisement in a national publication," it did not constitute sufficient contacts with
New York to provide the court with jurisdiction. 10 6
The court also rejected Hearst's argument that
Goldberger's contacts with New York residents by
e-mail were sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 10 7
In doing so, the court compared the transmittal
of e-mail messages to a resident in New York to
the act of sending a single letter or engaging in a
telephone conversation. 10 The Hearst opinion
also relied on the policy argument that allowing
interaction in cyberspace to establish sufficient
minimum contacts would be too broad an expansion of personal jurisdiction. 10 9
The court in Hearst relied a great deal on Judge
Stein's opinion in a similar case, Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). 1 1° In Bensusan Restaurant, the court considered an alleged trademark infringement claim
by the owner of a New York jazz club named the
Blue Note against the operator of a Missouri club
who operated a web site with the domain name,
See id. at *10.
See U.S. Mexican Dev. Corp. v. Condor, 91 Civ. 5925,
1992 WL 27179, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1992).
104
See Diskin v. Starck, 538 F. Supp. 877, 880 (E.D.N.Y.
102
103

1982).
105

See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *10.

106

Id. at *12.

See id. at *13. "In short, neither Goldberger's ESQWIRE Internet web site, which is the equivalent of an advertisement in a national publication, nor his e-mails, which are
equivalent to letters or telephone calls, are sufficient to provide this Court with personal jurisdiction over Goldberger
under CPLR § 302 (a)(1)." Id. (emphasis added).
108 See id. at *12. "Letters and telephone calls from
outside New York to people in New York are not sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1) or
the due process clause." Id. (citations omitted).
109 See Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *16. "Because the Web
enables easy world-wide access, allowing computer interaction via the web to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists." Id. (citing McDonough v. Fallon
McElligott, Inc., No.95-4037, slip op. (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6,
1996)).
110 See id. at *15-16.
107

"The Blue Note."'
The district court's opinion
holding that the assertion of jurisdiction violated
due process was recently affirmed by the United
12
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 1
The issue focused on whether the creation of a
web site accompanied by a telephone number to
order the advertised product was an offer to sell
directed to the forum state.' '3 In denying the assertion of jurisdiction, the court focused on the
fact that it takes several affirmative steps by the
New York residents to obtain access to the web site
and to use the information there. 1

4

Further-

more, "the mere fact that a person can gain information on the allegedly infringing product is not
the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting,
selling or otherwise making an effort to target its
product in New York." 1 5 While focusing on the
quality and nature of the defendant's contacts,
the court concluded that the mere creation of the
web site does not constitute sufficient minimum
contacts.'

16

The appellate court acknowledged that flexible
application of the traditional standards for personal jurisdiction was necessary to establish precedent with regard to the Internet. 17 The court
strictly construed New York's long-arm statute to
require that the non-domiciliary defendant or his
agent must commit a tortious act in New York for
jurisdiction to apply."" The court further declared that mere injury in New York would not
suffice.' 19 With regard to foreseeability, the court
111
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
112
See generally Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, No.
1383, Docket 96-9344, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10,
1997).
"
See Bensusan, 937 F.Supp. at 295.

See id.
Id.
116 See id. at 301. "Creating a site, like placing a product
into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or
even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state." Id. (citing Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1992)).
117 See Bensusan Restaurant, 1997 WL 560048, at *2.
"Although we realize that attempting to apply established
trademark law in the fast-developing world of the internet is
somewhat like trying to board a moving bus, we believe that
well-established doctrines of personal jurisdiction law support the result reached by the district court." Id.
11s Id. at *4 (concluding that plaintiff failed to allege
that defendant or his agent committed a tortious act in New
114
115

York).

119 Id. "Even if Bensusan suffered injury in New York,
that does not establish a tortious act in the state of New York
within the meaning of § 302 (a) (2)." Id.

COMMILAW CONSPECTUS

reasoned that King did not derive substantial revenues from the interstate commerce, and that the
business operation was essentially of a "local character." 120

IV.

THE FUTURE OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE

As alluded to earlier, one of the most difficult
issues posed by cyberspace is determination of the
applicable laws and customs. The fact that online
users are "real" people engaging in "real" transactions draws the obvious conclusion that traditional legal doctrines for personal jurisdiction are
applicable. 121

Even those who argue that tradi-

tional legal paradigms should not apply to cyberspace communities acknowledge that interactions
in cyberspace have effects in real world jurisdictions.' 22 Consequently, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri was mistaken when it determined that analogies to existing legal notions were not sufficient. 1 23 The

District Court for the Southern District of New
York properly recognized in Hearst that the more
reasonable approach is to analogize cyberspacejurisdictional issues with traditional case law. 12 4 In
following this approach, the courts will be able to
maintain consistent standards and avoid punish25
ing the Internet for its utility.'

Consider, for example, the striking similarities
120

See id.

See Zembek, supra note 2, at 346. "Some commentators clearly believe a new body ofjurisprudence is required to
address the emerging cyber-action. The commentators go so
far as to argue that both electronic communities and entities,
so called "virtual communities" and "e-persons," have bred
from the free flow of information and compilation of cyberrelationships. Id. The basic premise underlying these unprecedented communities and persons is that cyberspace is a
world unto itself, and because cyberspace is a fictional world,
it can have only fictional actions and places. See id. There is
no need to waste time with these unnecessary, albeit creative,
fictional legal models. See id. Traditional legal notions do fit
complex cyberspace questions once one realizes that both
the actors and activities are real." Id. (citations omitted).
122
See Byassee, supra note 8, at 199. "The interactions
between users in cyberspace have effects in real world jurisdictions, and the inhabitants of cyberspace are also citizens
of a physical jurisdiction." Id.
123
See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328,
1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996). "Because the internet is an entirely
new means of information exchange, analogies to cases involving the use of mail and telephone are less than satisfactory in determining whether the defendant has "purposefully
availed" itself to this forum." Id.
124
See Hearst Corporation v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ.
121
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between the facts of Maritz and Hearst. Both instances involved a web site which was not yet operational and provided a telephone number for further information. 126 The court in Maritz decided
that CyberGold's decision to transmit its advertisement in cyberspace, coupled with the knowledge
that it will be transmitted globally, was enough to
establish "purposeful availment." 127 However, by
comparing advertisements in cyberspace to the
traditional realm of advertising in a publication,
the Hearst opinion suggests that the scope of an
advertisement is usually not critical to the determination ofjurisdiction.

28

Furthermore, the web

sites at issue in both Maritz and Hearst merely advertised services to be provided in the future and
allowed Internet users to sign-up to receive the
services. 29 Such activity can hardly be characterized as "solicitation" of such a nature so as to constitute the transaction of business.
While the differences in opinions might be
most recognizable in the decisions regarding advertising on the Internet, the proper analysis for
whether personal jurisdiction exists is best exemplified by comparing the advertising cases to a
case involving contractual relations. Close examination of the nature of contacts reveals a critical
distinction. For instance, the court in Maritz rejected CyberGold's claim that it merely maintained a "passive" web site.' 30 The court's ruling
that the mere transmission of advertising informa3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997). "Unless
and until Congress or the New York legislature enacts Internet specific jurisdictional legislation, however, the Court
must employ New York's existing jurisdictional statutes,
CPLR § 301 and 302, and analogize to presently existing,
traditional, non-Internet personal jurisdiction case law." Id.
125
See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332. "Unlike the use of
the mail, the internet, with its electronic mail, is a tremendously more efficient, quicker, and vast means of reaching a
global audience." Id.
126
See id. at 1328; Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097.
127
See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333. "Through its web
site, CyberGold has consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all internet users, knowing that such information will be transmitted globally." Id.
128
See Hearst Corp., 1997 WL 97097 at *10 (noting that
under New York law, advertisements in national publications
are not sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction under the
relevant long-arm statute).
129
See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (noting that the web
sites "invites" internet users to use the service when it becomes operational); and Hearst, 1997 WL 97097 at *4
(describing web site consisting of brief description of services
non-domiciliary plans to offer).
130

Id.
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tion is contact of a sufficient nature to warrant jurisdiction is illogical in the modern era of computerization.13 1 The court ignores that one of the
features of the Internet is the global availability of
information at the time it is posted in cyberspace. 132 The court in Bensusan was faced with
similar facts, but there the court held that the nature of the advertisement on the Internet was passive since it required "affirmative steps" by the
1 33
residents of the forum state.

CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson marks a departure
from previous cases concerning advertising.'

34

The activity in CompuServe can accurately be described as active, since the non-domiciliary defendant entered into contractual agreements with
the plaintiff in the forum state and repeatedly
sent his software to the servers there.' 35 The distinguishing feature in CompuServe is the fact that
the defendant sought out the Ohio server and engaged in a contract to be governed by Ohio
law. 1 36 Justification of the decision in CompuServe
lies in the court's reasonable interpretation of the
term "transaction of business." In particular, the
analysis is whether the non-domiciliary contracted
for the sale of goods, transmitted the goods, or,
engaged in correspondence of a nature more in-

131
See Maritz, 247 F.Supp. at 1333. "Thus, CyberGold's
contacts are of such a quality and nature, albeit a very new
quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
that they favor the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant." Id.
132
See David L. Stott, PersonalJurisdiction in Cyberspace:
The ConstitutionalBoundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a
Web Site, 15J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819 (1997).
'Additional activity beyond a product entering a forum
through the stream of commerce is an important requirement for the minimum contacts analysis because of the very
nature of the Internet. By nature, once information is posted
on the Internet, that information is instantly in the stream of
commerce on a world-wide basis." Id. at 840.
133
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295,
299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). It takes several affirmative steps by the
New York resident, however, to obtain access to the Web site
and utilize the information there. See id. See also ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996). "Although content on the Internet is just a few clicks of a mouse away from
the user, the receipt of information on the Internet requires
a series of affirmative steps more deliberate than merely turning a dial." Id.
134
See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
135 Id. at 1264. See also, Stott, supra note 132, at 839-840.
"Thus, Patterson's shareware contract with CompuServe was
the additional action required to meet the purposeful availment requirement for minimum contacts." Id.

trusive than a single telephone call or a letter via
mail.
Analysis of the second requirement for personal jurisdiction, that is, compliance with the
provisions of due process, is simplified if a more
objective standard of transacting business is
adopted. The most obvious provision is whether
the non-domiciliary could reasonably anticipate
being haled into the court of a given jurisdiction. 137 As previously suggested, cyberspace is allencompassing and, therefore, makes it difficult
for users to know with whom or where they are
interacting. 3 " At least one court has determined
that the exercise of jurisdiction is proper only
when the nonresident expects or "should reasonably expect the tortious act to have consequences
in the state.'

13 9

Adoption of a clearer meaning of

the term "transaction of business" would eliminate the subjectiveness of this evaluation.
Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that a
finding of jurisdiction based soley on maintenance of a web site would mean there would be
worldwide jurisdiction over anyone who establishes a web site. 140 Courts have held that merely
placing an item into the "stream of commerce" is
sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction

136
See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260. "Both the SRA
(Shareware Registration Agreement) and the Service Agreement expressly provide that they are entered into in Ohio,
and the Service Agreement further provides that it is to "be
governed by and construed in accordance with" Ohio law."
Id.
137 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980).
138
See Stott, supra note 132, at 826. "[T]he nature of
cyberspace allows Internet users to access a Web site without
any awareness of the jurisdiction in which the Web site resides." Id. See also Johnson & Post, supra note 6, at 1371.
"The Net enables transactions between people who do not
know, and in many cases cannot know, each other's physical
location." Id.
139
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, No. 96-9344,
1997 WL 560048, at *4 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
140
See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pub.,
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039-1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
[Defendant] cannot be prohibited from operating its Internet site merely because the site is accessible from
within one country in which its product is banned. To
hold otherwise would be tantamount to a declaration
that this Court, and every other court throughout the
world, may assert jurisdiction over all information providers on the global World Wide Web.
Id. (citations omitted). See alsoJohnson & Post, supra note 6,
at 1375 (arguing that territorial regulation of online activities
serves neither the legitimacy nor the notice justifications).
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under the Due Process Clause.' 4 1 In accordance
with this overly expansive approach, it is argued
that in cyberspace, the creation of a web site is
equivalent to the placing of a product into the
stream of commerce.

42

However, the creation of

a web site alone does not constitute a requisite
physical act, and consequently, there is no such
placement into the stream of commerce.1 43 Likewise, the view that awareness that a product is
marketed in a forum eliminates any unfairness
and is sufficient to warrant the exercise ofjurisdiction 4 4 is inappropriate given the accessibility of
the Internet.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Since the Internet is a relatively new medium
that is constantly expanding, flexible application
of the traditional notions of personal jurisdiction
is necessary to ensure that justice is served. Specifically, long-arm statutes and the requirements
of due process must be applied not with blinders,
but rather with a degree of creativity that enables
courts to properly evaluate whether they have personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant. To do so, the term "transaction of business"
must be applied with consistency and should only
include those activities which objective, reasonable persons would expect it to include.
Despite the potential for widespread abuse,
courts must realize that extension of jurisdiction
will hinder the free flow of commerce and discourage technological advancements. This is not
to suggest that improper contacts or tortious con141

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.

102 (1992).
142
See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301. Creating a site, like
placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not
an act purposefully directed toward the forum state. See id.
(citations omitted).
143
See Byassee, supra note 8, at 211.
A remote transaction in the physical analogue of a cyberspace transaction requires a person to place the material

[Vol. 6

duct should be tolerated. Parties should not be
free to commit tortious acts in cyberspace under
the claim that their behavior cannot be challenged in the home jurisdiction of the person
harmed. On the contrary, there should be a duty
of disclosure to inform computer users who interact in cyberspace of the laws and customs to which
they are subject. For example, businesses should
have a duty of inquiry before entering into commercial transactions over the Internet, and should
stipulate as to what law governs.
Finally, courts must realize that the posting of a
web page is not "purposeful availment," and that
mere accessibility in the forum state without more
should not constitute the requisite nexus between
the harmful behavior complained of and the resultant injury. Courts must be wary that if they assert their jurisdiction over transactions which
arise in cyberspace, they are arguably threatening
to subject all Internet users to their jurisdiction.
There is the risk that the unsettled nature of
cyberspace law will cause businesses and educational instituions to refrain from using the Internet and, as a result, stifle the ability of the Internet to prosper as an effective method of
communication. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York has set forth
the seminal approach by applying current legal
standards in a clear and consistent manner. The
Court has addressed the issues associated with the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Internet
users and has set forth precedent that is likely to
ensure a smooth transition into the cyberspace
era.
at issue physically into the stream of commerce. A cyberspace transaction dispenses with this requirement. From
thousands of miles away, the customer may simply reach
out and complete the transaction herself. The transportation is entirely self-service.

Id.
144 See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 117 (suggesting that as
long as the defendant has knowledge that the product is marketed in the forum, "the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot

come as a surprise.").

